Syndicated loans, lending relationships and the business cycle by Steffen, Sascha & Wahrenburg, Mark
 
Syndicated Loans, Lending Relationships  
and the Business Cycle 
 
Sascha Steffen       Mark Wahrenburg
* 
 
 
 
02 March 2008 
 
Abstract 
 
 
The syndicated loan market, as a hybrid between public and private debt markets, comprises 
financial institutions with access to valuable private information about borrowers as a result 
of close bank-borrower relationships. In this paper, we seek empirical evidence for the costs 
of these relationships in a sample of UK syndicated loan contracts for the time period 1996 
through 2005. Using detailed financial data for both borrowers (private and public companies) 
and for financial institutions, we find that undercapitalized banks charge higher loan spreads 
for  loans  to  opaque  borrowers  using  various  measures  for  borrower  opaqueness  and 
controlling for bank, borrower and loan characteristics. We further analyze this hold-up effect 
over the business cycle and find that it only prevails during recessions. In expansion phases, 
however,  we do not  find evidence for banks exploiting their information monopoly. This 
finding is consistent with theories on bank reputation in bank loan commitments. Ambiguity 
about borrower financial health, which induces the information monopoly in the first place, 
also gives banks the discretion to exploit or not exploit informational captured borrowers. Our 
findings are both statistically and economically significant and robust to alternative bank and 
macroeconomic  risk  proxies.  We  address  potential  concerns  about  unobserved  borrower 
heterogeneity exploiting the panel data nature of our sample. Using firm-bank fixed effect 
regressions, we find supporting evidence for our theoretical framework. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
There is an extensive literature on the benefits of bank borrower relationships. James 
(1987)  and  Lummer  &  McConnell  (1989)  document  positive  share  price  reactions  for 
companies associated with the announcement of bank loan commitments. Since then, many 
researchers  have  attributed  these  benefits  to  the  monitoring  and  certification  function  of 
relationship banks. Even today, where loans have been much more commoditized
2, bank loan 
relationships are still found to be an important factor in corporate finance.
3 However, the costs 
of bank-borrower relationships have only hardly been explored.
4 This paper contributes to the 
strand of research arguing that costs associated with lending relationships are economically 
significant. We show that capital constrained banks exploit their information monopoly over 
borrowers with high costs of switching lenders charging a higher loan spread than their well 
capitalized peers (so called “weak bank effect”). This effect only prevails in recessions. In 
expansion  phases,  however,  we  find  evidence  consistent  with  the  idea  of  commitment  of 
lenders vis-à-vis their borrowers.  
In our empirical analysis, we employ a dataset of UK syndicated loan agreements for 
the  time  period  1996  through  2005.  According  to  Boot  (2000),  syndicated  loans  are 
positioned between relationship loans and arm’s – length financing. Preece & Mullineaux 
(1996)  find  a  positive  announcement  effect  for  syndicated  debt,  which  decreases  in  the 
number of lenders in the syndicate (i.e. when loans resemble public debt issues). Given these 
benefits of lending relationships, the syndicated loan market is an interesting setup to explore 
the existence and costs of information monopolies further.  
In this paper, we seek empirical evidence for information monopolies using a novel 
approach. We build on theoretical models as per Greenbaum et al. (1989), Sharpe (1990) and 
Rajan (1992). These authors show that relationship lenders have an information monopoly 
over outside investors which effectively locks-in the borrower and allows banks to extract 
monopoly rents. This stems from the uncertainty of outside investors regarding the quality of 
the borrower. We recognize two (albeit related) dimensions of uncertainty: Firstly, there is an 
adverse selection (winner’s curse) problem. Secondly, there are external events amplifying the 
adverse  selection  component.  We  find  that  increased  uncertainty  through  macroeconomic 
                                                 
2 E.g. loans are syndicated, traded in secondary markets or are securitized.  
3 Altman et al. (2004) 
4 Berger and Udell (1995), Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995), Schenone (2005) and Santos and Winton (2005) are 
notable exemptions. fluctuations  (represented  through  changes  in  GDP  growth  and  volatility  of  credit 
spreads) determine the existence of information monopolies.  
 
Banks credit policies fluctuate over the business cycle and they vary countercyclical.
5  
This lending cycle is depicted in Figure 1. The graph shows the results of a survey conducted 
by the Federal Reserve  Bank in Washington on a regular basis. Evidently, there is some 
variation in credit policies by banks and a sharp tightening of credit standards in the early 
1990s and 2000 which overlaps with periods of economic contraction (both in Europe and the 
US). Lending standards seem to vary for both small and large borrowers in a similar way. As 
shown by Ruckes (2004), the rationale is profit-maximizing behaviour of banks instead of 
carelessness of bankers. During recessions, the average quality of borrowers in the pool of 
credit  applicants  is  low.  The  costly  screening  process  therefore  serves  to  identify  a  high 
quality borrower in this pool. Since there is a high probability of having a negative credit 
assessment (which means the applicant is rejected), the marginal benefit from screening is 
low resulting in low intensity screening. Banks only possess very imprecise information about 
individual borrowers and base their lending decisions on general economic conditions. The 
lending volume is hence low during these periods. In other words, lending standards are tight 
during recessions. If the economy picks up, the average quality of the borrower improves 
thereby  increasing  the  probability  that  credit  assessments  turn  out  positive.  This  in  turn 
increases the marginal benefit of screening increasing the intensity of screening by banks. 
However,  beyond  some  point,  the  average  quality  is  too  high,  marginal  benefits  from 
screening decrease and, therefore, screening intensity drops again. The credit standards is lax 
in  good  times  increasing  the  default  risk  of  the  banks’  portfolios.  This  is  a  concern 
particularly for poorly capitalized banks.  If the  bad loans extended in good times default 
during recessions, these banks might suffer a severe hit on their capital compromising their 
financial  stability.    The  natural  question  evokes  whether  these  banks  price  their  loans 
differently compared to well-capitalized banks. 
 
 
                                                 
5 “There is doubtless an unfortunate tendency among some, I hesitate to say most, bankers to lend aggressively at 
the peak of a cycle and that is when the vast majority of bad loans are made”(Alan Greenspan, March 2001) 
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Figure 1: Net Percentage of Domestic Respondents Tightening Standards  
 
Source: Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices  (Data 
available on www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/surveys) 
 
 
Indeed,  comparing  borrowers  with  high  and  low  switching  costs,  we  find  that 
undercapitalized banks charge higher loan spreads for loans to firms facing high switching 
costs.  This  effect  is  shown  to  be  statistically  and  economically  significant.  We  find  that 
information monopolies exist in periods of economic contraction: Only weak banks raise their 
spreads  above  what  is  justified  by  credit  risk  for  borrowers  with  high  cost  of  switching 
lenders. This finding is consistent with reputation considerations and discretion in bank loan 
commitments.  Ambiguity  about  borrower  financial  health,  which  induces  the  information 
monopoly in the first place, also triggers bank discretion to renege in adverse situations (Boot, 
Greenbaum and Thakor (1993)). Banks put their reputation on the line offering these loan 
commitments.  Well  capitalized  banks  honour  their  commitment  not  exploiting  their 
information monopoly, thereby enhancing their reputation (and potentially increasing future 
fee income). For weak banks, in contrast, preserving their own financial health outweighs the 
benefits of future reputation and they charge their borrowers a higher spread. These results are 
robust to alternative measures of bank and macroeconomic risk proxies. 
Our  study  has  a  notable  advantage  over  prior  research  in  this  area.  Information 
problems  are  typically  greater  for  smaller  (private)  firms.  Our  sample  consists  of  private 
companies to a large extent. The theoretical models that provide the foundation of this study 
rest on the assumption that there is private information which is not observable by outsiders, 
an assumption that is particularly true for our  sample. As a consequence, we are  able to 
provide  greater  insight  into  the  size  of  informational  rents  that  banks  can  earn  in  the 
syndicated  loan  market.  To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  there  has  been  no  study  on   5 
informational  rents  and  the  behaviour  of  loan  spreads  across  the  business  cycle  in  the 
European loan market.   
However, there are some caveats to our analysis which we want to address here. These 
caveats are associated with the fact that our sample is drawn from the syndicated loan market 
which is structurally different to the single loan market. Lending syndicates are supposable 
large and the syndicated loan market is perceived as being extensively competitive which 
argues against finding any informational rent in the syndicated loan market. Nonetheless, we 
find evidence for the existence of information monopolies and a reduction in competition for 
some borrowers. More than 95 percent of our loans have a single lead arranger resembling the 
single lender in a bilateral lending relationship. This is true since the lead arranger negotiates 
the loan terms with the borrower and is also responsible for monitoring the borrower over the 
lifetime of the loan. As shown by Sufi (2006 (forthcoming)) for large US firms and Bosch and 
Steffen  (2006)  recently  for  (mostly)  private  but  also  public  firms  in  the  UK  market, 
information asymmetries evokes a moral hazard problem within the syndicate because of the 
monitoring role of the lead arranger. Both papers have shown that he has to hold a larger 
share  of  the  loan  if  information  asymmetries  are  more  pronounced  to  have  incentives  to 
monitor the borrower diligently. Furthermore, syndicates are more concentrated given other 
banks  higher  incentives  to  monitor  the  lead  arranger.  In  other  words,  there  is  empirical 
evidence that information generated on the lead arranger level is not observable by outside 
investors  which  finally  justifies  the  assumptions  of  the  theoretical  models  building  the 
foundation of this study. 
Our  matched  sample  of  bank,  borrower  and  loan  characteristics  allows  a  clear 
interpretation  of  the  results.  However,  there  is  a  possibility  of  a  sample-selection  bias  in 
unobserved  borrower  heterogeneity  that  might  bias  our  results:  opaque  borrowers  might 
choose weak lenders because they are denied credit from strong banks. If that is the case, 
weak banks in our sample have on average riskier portfolios and our results are driven by 
(unobserved) borrower risk rather than by bank effects. To control for this concern, we exploit 
the panel data nature of our sample to test whether a change in bank capital affects syndicated 
loan spreads for a given firm-bank match. The results provide supporting evidence for our 
theoretical framework. 
 
 
 
   6 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we discuss the different areas of research 
related  to  this  paper.  We  then  introduce  the  theoretical  framework  and  show  how  we 
implement this framework empirically. In section 4, we describe the data and variables used 
in  this  study.  All  results  and  robustness  tests  are  provided  in  section  5.  The  last  section 
concludes. 
  
 
2.  Related Literature 
 
This paper is specifically related to research on the unique role of banks in corporate 
finance.  Information  asymmetries  in  external  capital  markets  are  pivotal  to  explain  the 
existence  of  financial  intermediaries.  Theories  of  financial  intermediation  emphasize  the 
advantage  of  banks  in  solving  information  problems  (Leland  and  Pyle  (1977),  Diamond 
(1984),  Diamond  (1991),  Ramakrishnan  and  Thakor  (1984),  Boyd  and  Prescott  (1986)). 
Bank-borrower  relationships  play  a  significant  role  in  reducing  information  problems: 
interacting  with  their  borrowers  closely  over  time,  banks  produce  information  about  the 
borrower and firms can raise capital which they were not able to raise from non-relationship 
lenders  (see  e.g.  Fama  (1985)  and  Hoshi,  Kashyap  and  Scharfstein  (1993)).  Another 
dimension of relationship lending is financial services purchased by borrowers in addition to 
bank  loans.  Observing  the  borrower’s  cash  flows  and  operating  activities  increases  the 
precision of the bank’s information. Furthermore, cross-selling allows to spread fixed costs 
over multiple products (Allen, Saunders and Udell (1991), Nakamura (1991)).  
Empirical research on the unique role of banks provides mostly indirect evidence for 
the value of bank-borrower relationships focussing on the increase in the market value of 
equity of the firm as a result of the announcement of bank loans (e.g. James (1987), Lummer 
and  McConnell  (1989),  Hoshi,  Kashyap  and  Scharfstein  (1990),  James  and  Wier  (1990), 
Shockley and Thakor (1997), Kwan (1994) and Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995)). A 
common conclusion of these studies is that bank-borrower relationships are beneficial and 
produce  abnormal  returns  if  new  loans  and  loan  renewals  are  announced.  There  is  also 
empirical  evidence  that  losing  a  bank-borrower  relationship  is  costly.  Slovin,  Sushka  and 
Polonchek (1993) analyze the impact of the failure of Continental Illinois on the stock prices 
of its borrowers. They find that especially for borrowers without multiple (i.e. other) banking 
relationships the adverse stock price movement was notably stronger arguing in favour of the 
importance  of  information  generated  in  a  bank-borrower  relationship  which  is  not  easily 
transferable to or observable by outsiders.   7 
Other theoretical models analyze how interest rates on bank loans evolve over time. 
One strand of models demonstrates conditions under which interest rates decline over the 
course of the bank-borrower relationship (Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Boot and Thakor 
(1994)). Another strand, however, argues that banks subsidize borrowers at the beginning of 
their  relationship  in  the  expectation  of  future  rents.  Hence,  interest  rates  are  supposed  to 
increase  over  the  duration  of  the  relationship  (Greenbaum,  Kanatas  and  Venezia  (1989), 
Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992) and Wilson (1993)). Direct tests of these models are performed 
by Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) using data of small, not listed 
companies. These studies have two advantages over the above mentioned studies on bank 
uniqueness:    small,  not  listed  companies  belong  to  the  class  of  borrowers  for  which 
information problems are most severe and close bank relationships most beneficial. Further, 
they use the duration of the bank-borrower relationship as measure of the strength of the 
relationship as opposed to the “new versus renewal” measure. However, their results were 
mixed. Only Berger and Udell (1995) were able to find significant evidence for the benefits of 
relationship lending, i.e. they find a negative relationship between interest rates and duration 
of the relationship.
6 
 
Empirical literature analyzing the impact of financial health of banks on borrowers is 
limited. Closest to this study is the paper by Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002) who study the 
impact of bank capital on interest rates on loans. They argue that the existence of switching 
costs drive the negative relationship between bank capital and loan spreads. In the absence of 
switching  costs,  however,  this  effect  should  be  nil.  Their  study  suffers  from  3  important 
drawbacks: Firstly, they focus on large, publicly listed companies. This might understate the 
true impact of bank capital on cost of funds because firms for which switching costs should be 
more pronounced (i.e. private firms) are not present in their sample. Secondly, their sample 
period is rather small (1987-1992). A bank channel effect for business cycle and monetary 
transmission can therefore only hardly be shown. Thirdly, in addition to the impact on loan 
spreads, some borrower might also be denied credit, which cannot be analyzed with their data. 
In our study, we account for the first two effects. Employing a dataset comprising private 
firms to a large extent, we suppose to find higher weak bank effects than in the study by 
Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002). Furthermore, our analysis focuses on a longer time frame 
(1996-2005) and explicitly accounts for business cycle effects on loan spreads. 
                                                 
6 In contrast to Petersen and Rajan (1994) they included only loan commitments which might (according to the 
authors) explain the different results. We discuss this argument further in the empirical analysis.   8 
Other studies incorporating both borrower and bank characteristics build on Hubbard, 
Kuttner and Palia (2002). Coleman, Esho and Sharpe (2006) employ a novel, ex-ante proxy 
for monitoring and find that monitoring is a significant determinant of both loan maturity and 
loan pricing. Hao (2003), add as additional determinant for loan pricing the number of lead 
banks in the syndicate. He argues that multiple lenders affects the lenders’ effectiveness of 
monitoring and the determination of loan prices due to duplication of monitoring or free-
riding incentives and finds a positive relationship between the number of lead banks within 
the  syndicate  and  loan  spreads.  Both  do  not  analyze  the  impact  of  bank  effects  on  loan 
spreads for bank dependent versus not bank dependent borrowers as we do in this study. 
Further, we explicitly exclude syndicate structure characteristics from the regressions. We 
argue  that  the  number  of  lead  banks  proxies  for  the  competition  for  specific  classes  of 
borrowers and is driven by the transparency of the borrower. However, as shown by Ivashina 
(2005), including syndicate structure in the empirical model introduces simultaneity problems 
which we want to avoid here. As we have shown that the syndicate structure is driven by 
information asymmetry in Bosch and Steffen (2006), we implicitly account for competition 
with our switching cost proxies.
7 
 
This paper is also related to the few existing studies on the pricing of syndicated loans. 
Moerman (2005) analyzes the effect of information quality on the pricing of syndicated debt 
contracts. She measures information quality employing bid-ask spreads from the secondary 
loan  market  and  finds  that  higher  bid-ask  spreads  lead  to  higher  spreads  on  loans  issued 
subsequently  by  the  borrower.  Bosch  (2006)  focuses  on  how  the  information  asymmetry 
associated with the borrowing firm affects its syndicated loan spreads. His study is motivated 
by theoretical asset pricing literature showing that information asymmetries are a source of 
systematic  risk.  Bosch  finds  that  the  amount  of  publicly  available  firm  information 
systematically affects the loan spreads charged to the borrower. In particular, analyst coverage 
by stock exchange listings and third party certification by credit ratings increase borrower 
transparency, and thus lower interest spreads. Furthermore, Bosch documents that prior firm-
lender  relationships  mitigate  borrower  information  asymmetries  and  reduce  loan  spreads, 
whereas bank reputation is found to have no effect. Ivashina (2005) analyzes the impact of 
syndicate structure on loan spreads  and finds that, (carefully) accounting  for simultaneity 
                                                 
7 This argumentation contradicts with Hao (2003). He finds a positive impact of number of lead banks on the 
price of loans. We argue, supported by our descriptive statistics, that fewer number of lead banks proxy for 
reduced competition which implies a negative relationship between number of lead banks and spreads.   9 
problems in setting loan spreads and determining syndicate structures, a higher share of the 
loan held by the mandated arranger reduces the loan spread charged to the borrower.  
 
All studies accentuate the importance of asymmetric information in setting syndicated 
loan  spreads.  We  build  on  this  line  of  thought  arguing  that  information  asymmetries  in 
external  capital  markets  drive  (in  our  case)  the  costs  of  banking  relationships  for  bank 
dependent borrowers. 
 
 
3.  The Costs of Banking Relationships: Theoretical Framework and Empirical 
Implementation 
 
This paper draws from the theoretical models demonstrating conditions under which 
interest rates increase over the course of bank-borrower relationships. Greenbaum, Kanatas 
and Venezia (1989), Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) are important contributions which build 
the microeconomic foundation of this study. 
A common thread to all models is that a bank acquires proprietary (albeit imperfect) 
information in the process of lending to the firm which is unavailable to outside lenders and 
effectively locks-in the borrower. The latter also incurs additional costs in searching a new 
lender.
8  The  incumbent  (relationship)  bank  has  an  informational  advantage  over  the 
competitor banks which allows the former to extract a rent. A crucial determinant of the 
monopoly power is the uncertainty of the competitor banks about the quality of the borrower. 
One dimension of this uncertainty component is an adverse selection problem (the ‘winner’s 
curse’)  as  modelled  e.g.  by  Greenbaum,  Kanatas  and  Venezia  (1989)  and  Rajan  (1992). 
Assuming  that  the  relationship  bank  knows  that  the  borrower  will  fail  or  succeed  with 
certainty, it only bids for the loan if the borrower succeeds. If the borrower accepts the offer 
of the competitor bank and the loan is priced according to its marginal funding costs, the 
competitor bank earns a negative expected profit.
9 Therefore, the incumbent bank will adjust 
the offer according to its belief about the quality of the borrower. The higher the perceived 
quality of the borrower, the lower the lower the lending rate because the competitor bank bids 
more aggressively. The lower the perceived quality of the borrower, the higher the lending 
rate.  A  second  dimension  of  uncertainty  is  the  macroeconomic  environment.  During 
recessions, the uncertainty regarding the quality of the borrower increases and competitor 
                                                 
8 For further information about search costs see e.g. (1995) 
9 This argument assumes identical funding costs of incumbent as well as competitor bank.   10 
banks price theirs loans less aggressively. If uncertainty regarding borrower quality is high, 
firms face higher switching costs increasing the monopoly power of relationship banks.  
However, having monopoly power over borrowers does not necessarily imply  that 
banks exploit this power by charging higher spreads. Boot, Greenbaum and Thakor (1993) 
have shown that ambiguity about borrower financial health, which induces the informational 
advantage of the relationship lenders in the first place, also triggers bank discretion. As Boot, 
Greenbaum  and  Thakor  (1993)  put  it,  “[in  these  states],…the  bank’s  commitment  then 
becomes an illusory promise.” In other words, reputation considerations of the relationship 
bank constitute a commitment device: the expectation of banks to enhance their reputation 
and earn higher income in the future commits them not to exploit their monopoly power. 
Nonetheless, relationship banks might not commit to the promise not to exploit the borrower 
if their reputation is less important than their current financial stability. They then may extract 
a rent from their borrowers to preserve their own financial health. In other words, having an 
information monopoly does not mean that banks exploit their borrowers all the time, but they 
might  exploit  them  a  bit,  if  they  themselves  are  in  a  bad  condition.
10 The  answer  to  the 
question whether banks exploit their informational captured borrowers is therefore ultimately 
an empirical one. 
 
In order to implement this framework, we have to accomplish two thinks: First, we 
have to classify the borrowers according to their switching costs. Second, we need to account 
for a bank’s financial health. We start with the classification of the borrowers. 
In our empirical strategy, we take a different view than taken by Petersen and Rajan 
(1994, Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Berger and Udell (1995). Following Schenone (2005), 
we accentuate the existence of switching costs as the condition for banks to exploit their 
information monopoly. Our approach significantly differs from the methodology in her study, 
as we perform a cross-sectional analysis to analyze whether capital constrained banks charge 
higher spreads to informational opaque borrowers, using a variety of switching costs proxies.  
We  construct  four  measures  for  switching  costs,  based  on  prior  research  in  the 
relationship lending and syndicated loan literature. In our empirical analysis, we perform the 
analyses separately for these proxies. The proxies are constructed to capture the uncertainty of 
(non  relationship)  investors  in  external  capital  markets.  The  better  these  investors  are 
informed, the more precise their belief and the more aggressive their bid. This increases the 
probability  that  the  borrower  switches  to  other  lenders  and  increases  competition  for  the 
                                                 
10 There is some evidence for this effect in Hubbard et al. (2002). Due to time series limitation of their data, they 
could not explore this idea further.    11 
borrower which in turn reduces the information monopoly of the incumbent bank. Faulkender 
and Petersen (2006) present a similar result with an application to the public bond market: 
“We were told that the less banks had to introduce and explain a new issuer to the market, the 
more likely a public bond issue…would be.”   
The first proxy is Private vs. Public.  Private firms are unlikely to be monitored by 
rating agencies or covered by bank analysts, and hence information asymmetries are supposed 
to  be  particularly  large  between  these  firms  and  (non  relationship)  investors.  The  second 
proxy is Small vs. Large. Following Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), we choose the 30 percent 
quantile of sales as cutoff point for small firms. They found that firms within the size category 
rely more on information-intensive financing. The third proxy is Young vs. Old. Young firms 
lack a track record of successful completed projects and outside investors are uncertain about 
the management and potential growth options. The fourth proxy is First Time Loan vs. Prior 
Lending Relationship. This proxy is constructed based on earlier results in the syndicated 
loan  literature.  As  e.g.  pointed  out  by  Ivashina  (2005),  previous  relationships  reveal  the 
borrower reputation in the market and are associated with lower spreads. In other words, 
previous relationships reduce the informational advantage of the relationship bank. 
We further account for bank financial health using a Weak Bank specification similar 
to the one used in Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002). We elaborate on this specification in 
section 4.2. 
 
 
4.  Data and Methodology 
 
  Data 
 
The  data  for  this  study  are  obtained  from  five  different  sources  –  the  Dealscan 
database  from  Loan  Pricing  Corporation  (LPC),  UK  Companies  House,  van  DIJK’s 
Bankscope database, Datastream
11, and the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). 
 
We examine syndicated loans over the time period 1996 through 2005 only for UK 
borrowers covered by Dealscan.
12 All relevant loan characteristics, i.e. loan amount, spread 
(plus fees), deal active date, time to maturity, loan purpose and loan type are extracted from 
                                                 
11 We get information on interest rates and stock market volatility from Datastream. We comment on these 
variables in the respective part of the analysis. 
12 Carey, Post and Sharpe (1998)   12 
this database.
13 We further need identifiers for borrower and lender identity to match the loan 
data to the other databases. Lenders are identified using lender name, lender parent name and 
country; the variables name, region / country and SIC classification were used to identify the 
borrowers.  Since  Dealscan  lacks  all  relevant  borrower  information,  we  consult  actual 
company reports obtained from UK Companies House
14 to fill in the missing information. 
Furthermore, we use Dun & Bradstreet’s Hoovers database to obtain information whether a 
public firm is stock exchange listed and on which stock exchange(s) it is listed.  
We  supplemented  the  information  for  the  lead  lender  with  data  from  Van  DIJK’s 
Bankscope  database.  Bankscope  contains  information  on  over  25,000  banks  worldwide 
including  detailed  financial  statement  data  and  (bank  and  country)  ratings.  We  carefully 
account for loans issued by different subsidiaries of the same lender parent attributing each 
loan to the lender parent. All bank financial variables are therefore extracted on the lender 
parent level.
15 Both, borrower and lender financial data are taken from the year prior to the 
loan transaction. 
Our  raw  sample  contained  5,063  syndicated  loans  issued  to  UK  borrowers. 
Accounting for loans which are not fully confirmed and show structural inconsistencies and 
loans to borrowers from regulated and financial industries, we deleted 739 loans from the 
sample. Usable information on loan prices was only available for 3,146 of the remaining loans. 
We further required joint availability of borrower and lead bank data,
16 and also censored 
observations of the tier 1 capital ratio at the 99 percent level. Our final sample consists of 988 
loan transactions representing 305 different UK based firms and 99 different lead banks. 
 
We  identify  recessions  using  the  EuroCOIN  Index  provided  by  the  Centre  of 
Economic  Policy  Research  (CEPR)  as  indicator  for  economic  activity.  EuroCOIN  is  the 
leading  coincident  indicator  of  the  Euro  area  business  cycle  available  in  real  time.  The 
indicator provides an estimate of the monthly growth of Euro area GDP – after the removal of 
                                                 
13 One loan regularly consists of several facilities. These facilities are not typically identical, but differ in terms 
of  spread,  maturity  and  lender  composition.  Further,  each  facility  is  associated  with  a  particular  loan  type. 
Especially in the context of relationship lending, it is crucial to separate commitment loans (which are so-called 
“relationship loans”) and term loans (which are “transaction loans”; see e.g. Berger and Udell (1995)). Investors 
in these loans are typically very different. Therefore, we conduct all analysis at the facility level. However, in 
one of our robustness checks, we include only revolver (commitment) loans and hence implicitly account for 
“deal  versus  facility  level”  concerns  in  this  part  of  the  analysis.  Our  results,  however,  remained  largely 
unchanged. 
14 Companies House is the national institution responsible for storing all company information provided under 
the UK’s Companies Act 1985. Information provided includes all companies’ filings, industry affiliation, legal 
form as well as date of incorporation. 
15 We use financial statement data for all borrowers and lenders from the year prior to the transaction. 
16 We loose some observations because the lead bank shown in Dealscan is no bank but rather an institutional 
investor.   13 
measurement  errors,  seasonal  and  other  short-run  fluctuations.  In  other  words,  the  index 
represents only the cyclical component of GDP growth.
17 The index started in January 1988. 
Over the lifetime of the index, the quarterly growth rate averaged 0.59.  
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Figure 1: Economic Activity 
 
 
Based on definitions in earlier research, we define that an economy is in recession, 
when  the  EuroCOIN  Index  is  below  its  long  run  average  for  at  least  four  consecutive 
quarters.
18 Based on this definition, we identify the following periods of recession: 1995:03 
through 1996:08 (our sample period starts in 1996:01), 2000:12 through 2002:02, 2002:06 
through 2003:06 and 2004:07 through 2005:08.
19  
                                                 
17 EuroCOIN  is  constructed  using  a  dataset  covering  about  1000  monthly  variables  from  the  six  largest 
economies of the Euro area. Variables included are industrial production, consumer and producer prices, trade 
variables, money, stock prices and exchange rates, interest rates, labor market related variables and surveys 
among others. 
18 The EuroCOIN Index is based on an extension of the Stock-Watson XCI methodology, which was one of the 
leading coincident indicators for the US market until 2003. Its direct successor for the US economy is the 
Chicago  Fed  National  Activity  Index  (CFNAI)  which  is  also  an  extension  of  the  Stock-Watson  XCI 
methodology. Other researchers using the Stock-Watson index to measure economic activity relying on our 
definition of recession include Santos and Winton (2005).  
19 Four consecutive quarters of below average growth in GDP indicates long-term economic weakness which is 
in line with methods used for US Stock-Watson indices in earlier literature. However, we note that our analysis 
does not hinge on the classification “recession versus expansion” as described here. All we want to show is that 
economic uncertainties in general increase the cost of relationship lending. We employ further proxies using 
credit spreads and stock volatilities to support our empirical methodology later on.   14 
 
  Methodology 
 
In the empirical analysis, we estimate a cross-sectional model of a sample of n loans 
(i=1,…n). The basic regression model is specified as follows: 
 
  Weak Bank i i i i i i Spread c X Y Z u d b g l = + + + + +    
 
The  dependent  variable  (Spread)  is  the  All-In-Drawn  Spread  (AIDS)  reported  in 
Dealscan. This is generally used by researchers analyzing syndicated loan spreads since AIDS 
is the spread above the reference rate (LIBOR) including also annualized fees shared with the 
participants. However, arranger fees typically paid upfront to the arranger of the syndicate are 
not  included.  i X ,  i Y  and  i Z  are  vectors  of  bank,  borrower  and  loan  characteristics.  The 
variables are discussed below.
20 
 
 
Discussion of bank characteristics 
 
Our  key  explanatory  variable  in  the  empirical  model  is  Weak  Bank  which  is 
reminiscent of Hubbard et al. (2002) and defines undercapitalized banks. While Hubbard et al. 
use the capital-asset-ratio to identify weak banks, we use the tier 1 ratio for two reasons: 
Firstly, our sample period covers a period in which banks already (gradually) adapt to Basel 2 
regulatory requirements. The Basel Accord establishes as ratios two aggregates of accounting 
capital to risk weighted assets (and certain off-balance sheet activities). Primary or tier 1 
capital is required to exceed 4 percent of risk weighted assets, while total capital (tier 1 plus 
tier 2) has to exceed 8 percent of risk weighted assets.
21 Secondly, our dataset comprises 
banks from different countries with different accounting standards. To avoid biases due to 
different  accounting  regimes  as  good  as  possible,  we  use  these  standardized  regulatory 
measures.  We  employ  several  alternative  measures  to  define  a  weak  bank:  Our  principal 
threshold is a primary capital ratio of 6.3 percent corresponding to the 25 percent quantile. In 
                                                 
20 The Appendix also provides a comprehensive overview over the variables used in our analysis. 
21 Tier 1 capital consists of common stockholders’ equity plus noncumulative perpetual preferred stock and any 
related surplus plus minority interest in the equity accounts of consolidated subsidiaries less goodwill and other 
intangibles. Tier 2 capital consists of the allowance for loan lease losses, cumulative perpetual, long-term and 
convertible preferred stock; perpetual debt and other hybrid debt / equity instruments; intermediate term 
preferred stock and term subordinated debt.    15 
other words, a bank is undercapitalized if its primary capital ratio falls short of 6.3 percent. 
We further analyze the impact of undercapitalization using this threshold over each individual 
year. Alternative thresholds used in this study are (a) a primary capital ratio of 6.8 percent 
(median) and (b) whether the primary capital ratio falls in the range of 4.8 to 6.3 percent (1 
percent to 25 percent quantile).
22  
We  also  add  several  control  variables  for  bank  characteristics.  We  control  for  the 
monitoring  quality  of  the  bank  using  Loan  Loss  Provisions  which  is  measured  as  the 
provisions for loan losses relative to total loans. This variable is ambiguously discussed in the 
empirical literature. Some researchers argue that monitoring quality is inversely related to 
loan loss provisions. In the context of lending relationships, monitoring is an integral part of 
building an information monopoly. This implies a negative association with loan spreads. 
However, as carefully argued by Cook, Schellhorn and Spellman (2003), reputable banks 
might conservatively reserve for loan losses implying a positive relationship. Furthermore, we 
proxy for the quality of the loan portfolio using Non Performing Loans measured as the ratio 
of net charge-offs relative to total assets. We expect a positive relationship of non-performing 
loans and loan spreads since an increase in this ratio reflects ex post poor lending decisions 
that increases the risk of the bank portfolio. To account for liquidity risk, we further include 
Net Loans measured as the ratio of net loans relative to customer & short-term funding and 
Liquid Assets measured as cash and securities relative to customer & short-term funding in 
some specifications of the model. Low Liquid Assets is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
realization of liquid assets lies in the first quartile if its distribution. We also include Total 
Assets measured as the natural logarithm of the bank’s total assets. (The level of) Bank asset 
size can capture a variety of influences. Relationship lending might be associated with high 
fixed costs and economies of scale as argued by Boot and Thakor (2000). Further, large banks 
are more established in the market, have a larger network and hence are able to syndicate 
larger portions of a loan more easily. Large banks might also be able to sell multiple products 
to a borrower more easily and thus have an advantage in building information monopolies. 
We further account for lender country fixed effects. 
 
                                                 
22 Hubbard et al. (2002) use a capital- asset ratio of 5.5 percent. This is justified based on their sample including 
only US banks and primary capital requirements of banks of 5.5 percent imposed in 1985. Our sample includes 
banks from nineteen countries and we choose the thresholds according to the distribution of the tier 1 ratio in our 
sample. However, we do several robustness checks using the total capital ratio and capital-asset ratio. All results 
in this paper continue to hold (including the tests including only UK banks). These regressions are available 
from the author upon request.   16 
To address other possible explanations for our results, such as differences in credit risk 
and loan characteristics between bank and not-bank-dependent borrowers, we include several 
control variables. Some of these important variables are discussed below.  
 
Discussion of borrower characteristics 
 
We include several borrower control variables for both public and private companies 
which provide us a considerable advantage over prior studies. The variables are assumed to be 
exogenous and control for borrower credit and business risk. Following earlier studies (e.g. 
Bharath, Sunder and Sunder (2006) and Harjoto, Mullineaux and Yi (2005)), we use Firm 
Size to control for credit risk of the borrower. These studies have shown that, ceteris paribus, 
loans to large borrowers carry lower spreads. Lower spreads for these borrower can e.g be 
attributed to economies of scale in loan origination and monitoring (Booth (1992)). Banks 
may give larger loans only to borrowers, if they are certain that these borrowers are less risky. 
Therefore, firm size and spread are supposed to be negatively related.
23 Leverage Ratio is 
measured as the firm’s debt over total assets. It proxies for the risk of the firm’s debt and is 
supposed  to  be  positively  related  to  loan  spreads.  We  further  include  AGE  (since 
incorporation) measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s age since year of incorporation 
as a proxy for the firm’s business risk. Since older firms are supposed to be more established 
and lenders know the quality of the management, I expect a negative sign between firm age 
and loan spread. Interest Coverage Ratio is measured as EBITDA over interest expense and 
proxies  for  the  borrower’s  ability  to  meet  his  interest  repayment.  Interest  coverage  is 
supposed to be negatively related to loan spread. 
 
Discussion of loan characteristics 
 
We also control extensively for characteristics of the loan contracts which have been 
shown in prior literature to be significantly related to loan spreads. 
We include Maturity which is measured as the natural logarithm of the maturity of the 
loan. Results in prior research show that the relationship between maturity and spread is not 
unambiguous. Whereas Flannery (1986) suggests that loans with longer maturities are more 
risky, empirical work has never established this clear relationship. Coleman, Esho and Sharpe 
(2006)  report  a  possible  relation  whereas  Strahan  (1999)  and  Dennis,  Nandy  and  Sharpe 
                                                 
23 Firm size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets. In unreported tests we also used operating revenues 
to proxy for firm risk. Exchanging both variables for one another does not have an impact on the results.   17 
(2000) report a negative relation. However, the proxy controls for any possible impact of 
maturity on spread. To control for the size of the loan, we include Loan Size measured as the 
natural logarithm of the facility size. We further control for two specific types of loans in the 
sample which are extensively discussed in the literature, i.e. Revolver and Term Loans. Note 
that we include also amortizing term loans in the revolver classification. There is empirical 
evidence  that  mainly  banks  invest  in  amortizing  term  loans  (Term  Loan  A);  institutional 
investors like Private Equity or Hedge Funds have specified investment periods not matching 
an amortizing loan schedule. Term loans therefore include only bullet loans (Term Loan B, 
C,…). These loans are therefore regularly referred to as institutional loans (which we use 
interchangeably  in  this  study).  It  makes  economic  sense  to  treat  institutional  term  loans 
separately from amortizing term loans. Institutional term loans show longer durations than 
amortizing term loans due to their back-loaded repayments. This effect is not captured by 
maturity.  Coleman,  Esho  and  Sharpe  (2006)  also  find  that  pricing  relationships  are 
structurally unstable across term loans and revolvers. 
We further control for collateral. Results by Rajan and Winton (1995) suggest that 
collateral (and also covenants) should be more present in loans to firms that require more 
intensive monitoring. Booth and Booth (2006) examine the relationship between borrowing 
costs and the presence of collateral. They find empirical evidence for the Rajan and Winton 
(2005)  model  showing  that  the  presence  of  collateral  increases  with  default  risk  of  the 
borrower.    Dennis,  Nandy  and  Sharpe  (2000)  note  that  the  exclusion  of  the  information 
whether  the  loan  was  collateralized  or  not  would  bias  the  estimates.  However,  Dealscan 
misses  this  information  for  a  large  part  of  the  loans  included  in  our  sample.  Following 
Gottesman  (2004),  we  create  three  indicator  variables  to  incorporate  collateralization: 
Secured  indicates  that  the  loan  was  secured  and  Unsecured  indicates,  that  the  loan  was 
unsecured,  respectively.  Secured  (Missing)  is  a  dummy  variable  equal  to  one,  if  the 
information about collateralization is missing. Loans for which banks do not require collateral 
are supposed to be less risky than collateralized loans.  
 
We also include proxies for the quantity of loans issued in the same month a loan was 
issued.  There  is  anecdotal  empirical  evidence  that  comparable  transactions  in  the  market 
influence the loan contract terms. Gottesman (2004) reports that the demand for particular 
types of loan tranches (i.e. term loans or revolvers) even has an impact on the price of other 
loan types. Therefore, we include Revolver  Volume as quantity measure for all revolving   18 
loans and Term Loan Volume as quantity measure for all term loans issued in the same 
month the loan was issued. 
The  flexibility  of  pricing  syndicated  loans  has  increased  by  incorporating 
Performance  Pricing  features  in  debt  contracts.  As  noted  in  Ball,  Bushman  and  Vasvari 
(2006), performance pricing represent a shift from the use of less flexible covenants
24. The 
latter only allow an increase in interest rates if financial covenants are breached and they 
remain at a higher level even if the performance of the firm improves. Performance pricing 
allow the flexibility to increase or decrease interest rates dependent on the performance of the 
firm resolving adverse selection and moral hazard problems between borrowers and banks as 
e.g. documented in Asquith, Beatty and Weber (2004). A pricing grid is negotiated at the 
beginning of the loan tying the interest rate to changes in financial ratios or credit ratings. The 
lenders are protected against an unexpected deterioration of firm performance. Hence, we 
expect a negative relationship between performance pricing and spread. Other loan controls 
are Number of Facilities and Loan Purpose
25 dummies.  
 
We finally added some market controls, specifically the LIBOR which is the three 
month Euro LIBOR rate from the British Bankers’ Association. Following earlier studies, the 
LIBOR is calculated as the average of the daily rate for the month. We furthermore control for 
Term Structure, which is calculated as the difference between the ten year Treasury yield and 
the three month Treasury Bill.  
 
 
  Sample Characterization 
 
The final sample consists of 988 loans associated with 305 borrowers and 99 lead 
banks. Table I shows descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analysis for the full and 
the matched sample. The matched sample requires joint availability of bank, borrower and 
loan  characteristics.  The  average  facility  size  is  USD  463  million  with  a  maturity  of  66 
months. Borrowers pay on average 166bps over LIBOR.  
 
[Table I] 
                                                 
24 The use of covenants are discussed in Smith and Warner (1979), Dichev and Skinner (2002) and Chava and 
Roberts (2005). 
25 We explicitly control for general corporate purposes, corporate control, capital structure and project finance 
related purposes.   19 
 
We further show descriptive statistics in three different ways: (1) We group essential 
loan, borrower and bank characteristics according to borrower asset size. (2) We also show 
the percentage of loans issued and average facility size grouped by the number of lead banks 
present in the syndicate. (3) We finally show correlations among switching cost proxies in the 
style of Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002).  
 
[Table II] 
 
Table II characterizes loan, bank and borrower characteristics grouped by borrower 
asset size. It is interesting to note that 23 percent of all loans in the sample are associated with 
firms with asset sizes below USD 200 million
26. Only 10 percent of all loans go to firms with 
more than USD 10 billion book value of assets. The results for spread and loan maturity 
reveal a consistent pattern over the size categories: the smallest borrowers pay the largest 
spreads  with  an  average  AIDS  of  207  bps.  Furthermore,  they  borrow  with  the  longest 
maturities (107 months on average). The largest borrowers, however, pay the lowest spreads 
(60 bps on average) and borrow with the shortest maturities (44 months on average). Results 
for leverage ratios and interest coverage ratios do not show fully consistent patterns but they 
imply that small firms are much higher leveraged than large firms (almost 50 percent debt-
asset ratio for the smallest firms versus 27 percent for the largest firms). Interest coverage 
rations are significantly higher for firms with asset sizes less than USD 1 billion (20 percent 
for the smallest firms versus 3 percent for the largest firms). We also provide characteristics 
of  the  tier  1  ratio  and  equity-capital  ratio  which  already  give  some  support  for  our 
argumentation. Both the tier 1 ratio and the equity-capital ratio are smallest for banks lending 
to  the  smallest  borrowers  and  significantly  larger  for  banks  lending  to  larger  borrowers. 
However, the results are not clear-cut, i.e. only the multivariate regressions can finally falsify 
our null hypothesis controlling for firm, bank and loan characteristics. 
 
[Table III] 
 
Table III shows the percentage of loans issued and average facility size grouped by the 
number  of  lead  banks  present  in  the  syndicate.  This  table  provides  an  intuition  how 
concentrated the market for specific types of borrowers really is. We argue here, that league 
                                                 
26 In unreported descriptive results we observe that the median asset size in the smallest bucket is less than  
USD 60 million and the distribution is highly left skewed.    20 
tables indicating market shares of the lead arrangers in a given year are not an appropriate 
indicator for competition in the market. E.g. over our sample period, the highest market share 
for  lead  arrangers  is  less  than  five  percent  obtained  by  BZW  [Barclays  de  Zoete  Wedd] 
implying  high  competition  for  arranging  syndicates.  This  interpretation  suffers  from  2 
important  fallacies:  Firstly,  league  tables  are  constructed  on  the  basis  of  loan  volumes. 
Generally  the  total  deal  volume  is  attributed  to  each  lead  bank  in  the  syndicate.  This 
weighting scheme allows the larger investment banks to focus only on large deals increasing 
competition for those deals.
27 Secondly, albeit related to the first, they do not account for 
borrower characteristics associated with these deals. We cannot infer from league tables how 
competitive the market for specific classes of borrowers is. Syndicated loans to large public 
borrowers are commoditized goods with (at least nowadays) liquid secondary markets and 
competition is supposable larger for these firms.  
As already argued, competition is a good indicator for the existence of a relationship 
lender’s information monopoly. In panel B, we show evidence for market concentration using 
the number of lead banks in syndicates for private versus public firms.
28 A small number of 
lead banks resembles the notion of a concentrated credit market in Petersen and Rajan (1994, 
Petersen and Rajan (1995). 37 percent of all loans to private borrowers have only one lead 
bank (these loans represent 26 percent of the whole sample) and 70 percent have less than 
three lead banks.
29 The average loan size reported indicates that few lead banks cannot be 
attributed to small loan sizes: the average loan size of loans to private firms with one lead 
bank is USD 107 million which implies that information problems determine the structure of 
the syndicate consistent with our earlier paper (Bosch and Steffen (2006). These findings 
indicate that information monopolies are potentially important in a syndicated loan setting. 
However, panel B also shows that 27 percent of the loans to public firms are associated with 
rather concentrated syndicates, which seems to  contradict our hypothesis that information 
monopolies are relevant only for firms with high switching costs. Again, to disentangle the 
different influences of borrower, bank and loan characteristics, a more detailed analysis is 
needed. 
 
[Table IV] 
 
                                                 
27 There is casual evidence that this is actually the case. One practitioner answered in an interview that the 
investment banks today are able to increase income keeping their revenue stable, simply by focussing on large 
deals which can be done with a smaller workforce. 
28 Results are similar for all other switching cost proxies used in this study. 
29 Unreported results show that 24 percent of the total private sample only has two lenders.   21 
Table IV shows correlations among the switching cost proxies. Private borrowers are 
more likely to be small, young and first time borrowers in the syndicated loan market. Small 
companies are more likely to be private, young, and first time borrowers. First time borrowers 
are more likely to be private, small and young. 
 
 
5.  Multivariate Analysis 
 
  Loan Spreads for Bank and Not-Bank Dependent Borrowers 
 
This  section  discusses  the  multivariate  analysis  of  the  impact  of  banks’  capital 
constraints (weak bank effect) on the spread in syndicated loan contracts controlling for loan, 
bank and borrower characteristics.  
 
[Table V] 
 
Table  V  shows  full  sample  regression  results.  With  the  sample  drawn  from  the 
syndicated loan market  where there is, at least to some extent, concentration among lead 
banks, there is a clustering of observations by lead bank. As loans with the same lead bank are 
unlikely to satisfy the OLS assumption that loans are independent, to account for clustering 
by lead bank we use OLS with cluster corrected standard errors. In all models shown in table 
2, the dependent variable is the AIDS. Loans where the secured status is missing are omitted. 
All regressions control for year, industry and lender country effects. Further borrower and 
loan  variables  are  included  in  all  regressions  as  described  before.  However,  no  variables 
carried a coefficient with unexpected signs nor do the coefficients change to a larger degree 
between the regression models. They remain unreported for brevity. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. 
The weak bank effect varies between 33 bps and 40 bps dependent on the bank control 
variables used in the regression. In models 1 to 4, we include various control variables for 
bank  portfolio  and  liquidity  risk  discussed  earlier.  Due  to  multicollinearity  reasons,  we 
introduce  the  variables  step  by  step.  The  coefficient  of  the  weak  bank  variable  remains 
positive and highly significant in models 1 and 2. However, controlling only for liquidity risk, 
the coefficient is at beast weakly significant. Further, the coefficients for the liquidity proxies 
run counter the proxies for portfolio risk: the higher the bank’s liquidity risk, ceteris paribus,   22 
the  lower  the  spread  charged  to  the  borrower.  Including  both  portfolio  and  liquidity  risk 
proxies  in  the  regression,  the  liquidity  effect  diminishes.  The  coefficient  for  loan  loss 
provisions is highly significant and negative as in models 1 and 2. This is consistent with the 
notion that good monitors (which do not have to provide for loan losses ex-post) are able to 
charge higher spreads. The weak bank coefficient is positive significant at the 99 percent 
confidence level and comparable in magnitude to models 1 and 2.  
The full sample analysis reveals that weak banks charge higher loan spreads than their 
well capitalized peers. This effect is larger than found by Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002) 
which can be traced back to the fact that a large portion of borrowers in our sample are small 
and private firms. They found weak bank effects in their study varying between 19 bps and 22 
bps. The impact we find is also economically significant. The distribution of loan spreads in 
our  sample  shows  that  price  buckets  frequently  differ  by  25  bps.  The  weak  bank  effect 
charged to borrowers hence bumps up the spreads by one price bucket.  
Consistent  with  prior  studies,  institutional  term  loans  carry  higher  loan  spreads, 
reflecting longer maturities and higher risk due to back-loaded repayments. Collateralized 
loans  have  ceteris  paribus  54  bps  to  63  bps  higher  loan  spreads.  This  supports  earlier 
empirical findings that loans to riskier borrowers are generally collateralized. As we expected, 
performance pricing features reduce the spreads required by lenders. Being able to increase 
loan spreads once the borrower’s financial situation deteriorates also increases loan safety. 
Including covenants in loan contracts ceteris paribus increases loan spreads consistent with 
the notion that covenants are needed for borrowers which need more intensive monitoring.  
 
[Table VI] 
 
Table VI only reports the coefficients of the bank variables for brevity. However, the 
control variables are identical to the models discussed above. The first column in panel B 
repeats the first model for comparison reasons. In models 6 and 7, we use different thresholds 
to show that our results are robust to different threshold specifications. In model 6, we define 
a bank as capital constrained if its tier 1 ratio is less than 6.8 percent (the median value). The 
results  show  that  the  weak  bank  effect  is  (almost)  identical  to  model  1.
30 If  we  use  the 
difference between the first and 50
th percent quantile as threshold, the weak bank effect still 
remains significant, however the magnitude changes to 20 bps.  
                                                 
30 Results change after the fourth decimal point.   23 
Model 8 introduces year effects analyzing whether weak bank effects are associated 
with particular years. We find an interesting result: at the beginning of our sample period, the 
weak bank coefficient is negative and (weakly) significant. A positive and significant effect 
can only be observed in the year 2003 and beyond. However, even though not significant, 
weak banks seem to charge significantly higher spreads starting in 2001. Unreported results 
(which include the same regression but without clustering the observations at the lender level) 
draw  our  attention  even  further  to  the  fact  that  weak  banks  charged  significantly  lower 
spreads before 2001. This finding is explored further below.  
 
However, we still need to find convincing evidence that this weak bank effect can be 
traced back to firms with high switching costs consistent with our theoretical framework. In 
Table 3 – Panel A, we therefore rerun our regressions in subsamples split according to our 
switching cost proxies: (1) private vs. public, (2) small vs. large, (3) young vs. old and (4) 
first time vs. prior relationships. Private is a dummy variable equal to one, if the firm is 
private. Small is dummy variable equal to one, if the company’s sales figure is below USD 
430 million, which is the 30 percent quantile. Young is dummy variable equal to one, if the 
firm’s age since incorporation is equal or less than 9 years which is the median age in our 
sample. First time is a dummy variable equal to one, if the firm borrows for the first time in 
the syndicated loan market. 
 
[Table VII] 
 
In order to show the weak bank effect in the most pronounced way, we report only the 
coefficient of the weak bank proxy in this table. Borrower and loan controls are identical to 
model 1. Model 1 is used as a benchmark model throughout our further empirical analysis.  
The results in panel A provide clear evidence that weak banks charge significantly 
higher spreads to firms with high switching costs. Depending on the proxies for switching 
costs employed, this effect varies between 49 bps and 79 bps. For firms facing low switching 
costs, we do not find a significant effect. This is consistent with the result of Bosch and 
Steffen  (2006)  who  find  that  lead  arranger  hold  larger  shares  of  private  companies  than 
necessary to have incentives to monitor borrowers subject to high information asymmetries 
and convince other lenders to participate in the syndicate. This can be explained by more 
profitable loans to private firms, an argument strongly supported by the results of this paper: 
In  addition  to  possible  larger  arrangement  fees,  banks  are  able  to  charge  private  firms  a   24 
premium for their own capital constraints making these loans more profitable than loans to 
firms which can easily switch lenders. We have to be careful, though. The profitability of the 
loan then stems from an increase in monopoly power which might or might not be exploited 
by the lead arranger. Our results indicate two important facts: Firstly, information generated 
for private firms is proprietary on the lead arranger level inducing an information monopoly. 
Secondly,  banks  do  not  exploit  their  monopoly  power  all  the  time.  If  all  banks 
opportunistically exploited their borrowers, we would not find a weak bank effect, which 
provides strong support for our theoretical framework that reputation and discretion matter in 
bank loan commitments.  
 
In panel B, we further explore our earlier finding that weak bank effects occur only for 
loans issued after 2001. Again, only the coefficient for the weak bank proxy is shown in this 
table.  We  find  the  same  results  across  all  switching  cost  proxies:  consistent  with  our 
theoretical framework, weak banks charge higher spreads for firms with high switching costs 
compared to firms with low switching costs. Most interestingly, however, the results seem to 
be driven by loans issued after 2001. The benchmark model shows that weak banks charged, 
ceteris paribus, 70 bps higher spreads for loans issued after 2001. Before 2001, we find no 
significant effect. Depending on the switching cost proxy used, the weak bank effect varies 
between 80 bps and 121 bps. Some comments are in order. First, we want to stress the point 
that the fact that we do not find a weak bank effect for loans issued before 2001 does not 
imply that information monopolies do not exist there. They may or may not exist depending 
on the quality of the borrower as perceived by outside investors. However, if banks have 
monopoly power, weak and strong banks either both exploit their borrowers or neither of 
them do. Both are potential explanations of our result. After 2001, capital constrained banks 
charge higher spreads. The first years of the new millennium are characterized by several high 
profile bankruptcies in the United States. Enron and WorldCom are two well known examples 
of bankruptcies wiping out about USD 34 billion in loans during this economic slowdown. In 
a weak economy, banks usually take some hits due to an increase in bad debt. A possible 
explanation for the weak bank effect we find is a shock to bank capital of at least some banks 
caused by these hits which ultimately leads them to charge these costs to borrowers with high 
costs of switching lenders. Consequently, before 2001, banks care more about their future 
reputation and commit themselves not to exploit their borrowers.  In the next section, we 
identify periods of recessions and expansions to find further support for these arguments.  
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  Accounting for the Business Cycle 
 
This section analyzes loan spreads for bank dependent and not bank dependent borrowers 
through the business cycle. As described above, we define that an economy is in recession, 
when the EuroCOIN Index is below its long run average for at least four consecutive quarters. 
Based on this definition, we identify the following periods of recession: 1995:03 through 
1996:08 (our sample period starts in 1996:01), 2000:12 through 2002:02, 2002:06 through 
2003:06 and 2004:07 through 2005:08.   Before 2001, at least for our sample period, the 
economy was (mostly) in an expansive phase. If the state of the economy explains our earlier 
results,  we  expect  to  find  significant  coefficients  for  the  weak  bank  variable  analyzing 
subsamples for loans issued in recessions and expansions, respectively.  
 
 
[Table VIII] 
 
Table VIII reports only the weak bank coefficient. All models include borrower and 
loan controls as reported in the benchmark model. Panel A repeats the result from Table 3 – 
Panel  A  for  comparison.  The  benchmark  model  shows  that,  ceteris  paribus,  weak  banks 
charge on average 78 bps higher spreads in recessions. In expansion phases, we do not find 
significant  effect.  The  results  are  consistent  across  all  switching  cost  proxies  and  the 
coefficients vary between 86 bps and 123 bps. All coefficients are very similar in terms of 
their magnitude to the ones reported in Table 3 – Panel B analyzing loans issued before and 
after  2001,  respectively.  With  regard  to  the  distribution  of  the  AIDS,  the  results  are 
statistically and economically significant. 
These findings give strong support to our arguments in the last section. Recessions 
amplify  already  existing  uncertainties  regarding  the  quality  of  a  borrower  increasing  the 
monopoly power of relationship banks. Even more important, a rise in bad debts and company 
failures is troubling for some banks causing them to exploit informational captured borrowers 
in order to preserve their own financial health. Strong banks, however, do not exploit their 
information monopoly. They commit to their borrower to build closer ties and to increase 
their future expected income. In expansion phases, there is no significant evidence for a weak 
bank effect. Information monopolies, if they exist, are not exploited by relationship banks. 
These results are consistent with our theoretical framework.    26 
 
  Accounting for Lender Country Effects 
 
Our sample includes loans extended by banks from countries other than the UK. The 
analysis might be subject to criticism since bank borrower relationships are relevant for small 
private  firms  with  high  switching  costs  and  close  ties  between  banks  and  borrowers  are 
supposable less relevant for banks not domiciled in the UK. We rerun the models from Table 
4 excluding all non-UK banks. This reduces the sample size to 522 loans extended to 203 
borrowers by 38 UK domiciled banks. 
 
[Table IX] 
 
Table IX shows regression results of the impact of banks’ capital constraints on the 
loan spread including only UK domiciled banks. All regressions are heteroscedasticity robust 
clustered at the lender level and we report only the weak bank coefficient for brevity. All 
borrower,  loan  and  market  controls  are  identical  to  model  1  in  Table V.  The  benchmark 
model shows that weak banks charge on average 48 bps higher loan spreads than their well 
capitalized peers. This effect is driven by loans issued in recessions with an average increase 
of loan spreads by 113 bps if the loan is extended by a weak bank. All of our earlier results 
hold consistently across all switching cost proxies. The impact of the weak bank effect is 
higher compared to the results including non UK banks implying that relationships are more 
relevant for loans issued by UK banks. This is consistent with the finding that most of the 
firms in this sample are less than seven years old. In other words, companies with higher 
switching costs borrow from UK domiciled relationship banks and information monopolies 
are larger for these banks. 
 
6.  Robustness Checks & Discussion 
 
As described earlier, our results do not depend on the definition of recession we have 
used  in  this  study.  This  section  shows  that  external  events  that  increase  uncertainties  in 
external capital market induce information monopolies of relationship banks.    27 
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Figure 3: Credit Spread 
 
 
To  proxy  for  these  uncertainties,  we  employ  the  credit  spread  calculated  as  the 
difference between Moody’s AAA corporate bond and Moody’s Baa corporate bond (middle) 
rates.  
Figure 3 characterizes the credit spread over the time period 1992 and 2006. The solid 
line represents the average credit spread over this period. If the spread is above its average, 
credit  spreads  are  wider  implying  higher  uncertainty  regarding  the  viability  of  low  rated 
companies. We observe some remarkable spikes in the credit spread curve. In 1992, we still 
notice repercussions from the Gulf war in 1991. In 1998, spreads significantly widened again 
as a result of the Asia crisis and the subsequent default of LTCM. In the early 2000s, the 
economy suffered further hits by 9/11 and the failures of Enron and Worldcom increasing 
credit spreads to the highest level for at least a decade.  
 
We control for these effects introducing the variable Credit Spread as defined above 
and rerun our regression
31. The results are shown in Table X. 
 
[Table X] 
 
                                                 
31 Note that credit spread is included in absolute terms in contrast to recession versus expansion and whether 
loans were issued before or after 2001, which were binary variables.   28 
Model 1 repeats the model already shown in Table V. Model 9 includes credit spread 
as additional variable. An increase in credit spreads by one percentage point increases loan 
spreads by 58 bps. The weak bank proxy remains significant in almost unchanged magnitude. 
In model 10, we interact the weak bank and credit spread variables. 
 
The results support our theoretical framework. Loan spreads rise on average by 43 bps 
if the credit spread increases by one percent. Weak banks charge higher spreads in times of 
higher uncertainties exploiting an information monopoly. Thus, on average, the widening of 
credit spreads by one percent increases the interest rates on loans by 55 bps conditional on the 
loan being provided by a weak bank (obtained by summing the coefficients of the weak bank 
indicator variable and the interaction term). However, the coefficient of the weak bank effect 
is no longer significant showing that the weak bank effect is primarily driven by external 
events which increases the monopoly power of relationship lenders and, more importantly, 
adversely  hits  some  banks’  capital  which  induces  them  to  exploit  borrowers  with  high 
switching costs.  
 
Panel B shows further robustness tests introducing qualitative proxies for bank risk. 
Prior research has shown that commercial banks are less risky than investment banks due to 
the trading activities of the latter. Model 11 introduces Commercial Bank as dummy variable 
equal to one, if the loan was extended by a commercial bank. All other control variables 
remain unchanged. We find robust results for the weak bank effect with an increase in loan 
spreads by 43 bps. Commercial banks charge on average 27 bps lower spreads. Model 12 
excludes  all  other  bank  variables  but  includes  commercial  bank  and  Investment  Bank  as 
controls for bank risk. Consistent with earlier literature, commercial banks charge on average 
30 bps lower spreads. Investment banks, however, charge on average 238 bps higher spreads. 
The weak bank coefficient is still highly significant. All robustness checks give strong support 
to our theoretical framework and our empirical model. 
 
Our  matched  sample  of  bank,  borrower  and  loan  characteristics  allows  a  clear 
interpretation  of  the  results.  However,  there  is  a  possibility  of  a  sample-selection  bias  in 
unobserved  borrower  heterogeneity  that  might  bias  our  results:  opaque  borrowers  might 
choose weak lenders because they are denied credit from strong banks. If that is the case, 
weak banks in our sample have on average riskier portfolios and our results are driven by 
(unobserved) borrower risk rather than by bank effects. To control for this concern, we exploit   29 
the  panel  data  nature  of  our  sample  and  rerun  our  tests  using  firm-bank  fixed  effect 
regressions. However, the main results remain qualitatively unchanged.
32 
 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we analyzed the possibility of banks to charge idiosyncratic costs to 
borrowers comparing firms with high and low switching costs. We find strongly supportive 
results for the existence of information monopolies that allow weak banks to charge higher 
spreads to borrowers with high switching costs. Further analyses indicate that the results are 
primarily  driven  by  external  events  (such  as  recessions)  which  increase  uncertainties 
regarding  the  viability  of  borrowers  with  high  switching  costs  amplifying  the  adverse 
selection  (winner’s  curse)  problem.  More  importantly,  these  shocks  and  the  associated 
increase in bad debts and company failures adversely affect the financial health of at least 
some banks which respond by charging higher spreads to informational captured firms than 
their well capitalized peers. Those (strong) banks keep their commitment with their clients 
probably to strengthen their relationships in expectation of higher future income. Our results 
are both statistically and economically significant and consistent with theoretical models as 
per Greenbaum, Kanatas and Venezia (1989), Rajan (1992) and Boot, Greenbaum and Thakor 
(1993).  Further analyses and robustness checks support the notion that bank effects have an 
impact on syndicated loan spreads. 
There are several possibilities to extend this analysis further. For example, it might be 
interesting to analyze investment behaviour of private firms which borrow from weak banks 
following earlier literature on the bank lending channel. It might be also interesting to analyze 
the value of bank-borrower relationships in a syndicated loan setting in a more direct way 
applying a panel data approach looking at the development of the relationship over time. This 
way, we might be able to directly test predictions of theoretical models about how interest 
rates develop, if the bank-borrower relationship evolves. Based on prior research, syndicate 
structures are sensitive to borrower opaqueness and credit risk. Since periods of recessions 
increase the overall risk in the economy, it is interesting to investigate the change in  the 
structure of loan syndicates across the business cycle as well, something we are currently 
pursuing.  
                                                 
32 The regressions are not reported for brevity but are available from the author upon request.   31 
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APPENDIX 
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
 
Variable  Definition 
  
1. Borrower Opaqueness / Switching Cost Proxies 
Private  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower's legal status is private. 
Public  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower's legal status is public. 
Small 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower's sales are below USD 430 million, which 
corresponds 
 to the 30 percent quantile. 
Large 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower's sales are above USD 430 million, which 
corresponds  
to the 30 percent quantile. 
Young 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower's age of incorporation is equal or less than 9 
years,  
which is the median age. 
Old 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower's age of incorporation is higher than 9 years, 
which is  
the median age. 
First-Time Loan 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower has not issued a loan in the syndicated loan 
market before. 
Relationship Loan 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower has issued a loan in the syndicated loan market 
at least once. 
    
 
2. Weak Bank Proxies 
Weak Bank  
(Tier 1-Ratio < 6.3% (1st quartile)) 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank's primary capital ratio is less than 6.3 percent, which 
corresponds to the 25 percent quantile. 
Weak Bank  
(Tier 1-Ratio < 6.8% (Median)) 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank's primary capital ratio is less than 6.8 percent, which 
corresponds to the 50 percent quantile. 
Weak Bank  
(4.8 < Tier 1-Ratio < 6.8) 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank's primary capital ratio is higher than 4.8 percent (1 
percent quantile) but less than 6.8 percent (50 percent quantile). 
   
  
3. Borrower Characteristics 
Firm Size  Firm size is the natural logarithm of the borrower's total assets. 
Leverage Ratio  Leverage ratio is measured as total debt over total assets. 
Age (since incorporation)  Natural logarithm of the borrower's age since incorporation. 
Interest Coverage Ratio  Interest coverage ratio is measured as EBITDA over interest expenses. 
   
  
4. Lead Bank Characteristics 
Loan Loss Provisions  Loan loss provisions are measured as the provisions for loan losses relative to total loans. 
Non Performing Loans  Non performing loans are measured as the ratio of net charge-offs relative to total assets. 
Net Loans  Net loans are measured as the ratio of net loans relative to customer & short term funding. 
Liquid Assets 
Liquid assets are measured as the ratio of net loans relative to customer & short term 
funding. 
Low Liquid Assets 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the realization of liquid assets lies in the first quartile of its 
distribution. 
Total Assets  Total assets are measured as the natural logarithm of the bank's total assets. 
Commercial Bank  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the mandated arranger is a commercial bank. 
Investment Bank  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the mandated arranger is an investment bank. 
Lender Country
*********  Dummy variable for each country, the parent lender is domiciled in. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
********* Lender parents are domiciled in the following countries: Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, 
Iceland, Ireland Italy, Japan, Korea (South), Luxembourg, Netherlands, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, USA, United Kingdom   36 
 
APPENDIX 
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS (CONTINUED) 
 
Variable  Definition 
  5. Syndicated Loan Characteristics 
All-In Spread Drawn (AISD)  Spread above LIBOR in basis points (bps) of the drawn portion of the loan 
Loan Size  Natural logarithm of the facility amount (in US-Dollar) 
Maturity  Natural logarithm of the maturity in days 
Number of Facilities  Number of facilities in loan deal 
Pro-Rata Loan  Dummy variabl equal to 1 if the loan type is Revolver (> or < 1 year), Term Loan A 
Institutional Term Loan  Dummy variables equal to 1 if the loan type is Term Loan B, C,… 
Performance Pricing  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the LIBOR-Spread is contingent on ex-post performance of the borrower. 
Secured  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is secured. 
Unsecured  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is unsecured 
Missing  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the secured status of the loan is missing 
Covenants  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan agreement contains covenants 
Loan Purposes
†††††††††   
General Corporate  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan issuance purpose is "General Corporate" 
Coporate Control  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan issuance purpose is "Corporate Control" 
Capital Structure  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan issuance purpose is "Capital Structure" 
Project Finance  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan issuance purpose is "Project Finance" 
Other  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan issuance purpose is "Other" 
   
   6. Market Controls 
   
Credit Spread  Difference between Moody’s AAA corporate bond and Moody’s Baa corporate bond (middle) rates. 
LIBOR  Three month Euro LIBOR rate from the British Bankers' Association 
Loan Issued Prior 2001  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is issued before 2001 
Loan Issued in Recession  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is issued in a recession. We define that an economy is in 
recession,  
when the EuroCOIN Index is below its long run average for at least four consecutive quarters. 
Revolver Volume  Quantity measure for all revolver loans issued in the same month the loan is issued 
Term Loan Volume  Quantity measure for all term loans issued in the same month the loan is issued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
††††††††† Each broad loan purpose group is comprised of the following loan purposes: (1) General Corporate: Working Capital, Corporate 
Purposes, Capital Expenditures, Equipment Purchases, Trade Finance, IPO Related Financing; (2) Corporate Control: Acquisition Line, 
Takeover, LBO / MBO, Defensive Bid; (3) Capital Structure: CP Backup, Credit Enhancement, Debt Repayment, Recapitalization, Stock 
Buyback; (4) Project Finance: Project Finance, Aircraft & Ship Finance; (5) Other: Exit Financing, Lease Finance, Other, Real Estate, 
Securities Purchase, Spinoff, Telecom Buildout, Undisclosed, CDO.   37 
TABLE I 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
This table presents descriptive statistics for completed dollar denominated loans, originated between 1996 and 2005, to U.K. companies 
excluding regulated and financial industries. Borrowers’ and lenders’ characteristics are computed as of one year prior to the origination of 
the loan. For definitions of other dependent variables, please see the appendix. The full sample includes all loans facilities, for which all loan 
characteristics are simultaneously available.  The matched sample (sample with firm & bank characteristics) comprises only those loan 
facilities, for which bank, borrower and loan characteristics are simultaneously available. 
 
 
Full Sample  
(N=3,146)    
Sample with Firm & Bank Data  
(N=988) 
   Mean  Median StdDev    Mean  Median StdDev 
               
All-In Spread Drawn (bps)  184.21  175  153.56    165.68  145  140.06 
Loan Size ($MM)  368  126  929    463  166  121 
Maturity (months)  78  78  47    66  60  35 
Institutional Term Loan (dummy)  0.37  -  0.48    0.32  -  0.47 
Pro-Rata Loan (dummy)  0.45  -  0.5    0.49  -  0.5 
Performance Pricing (dummy)  0.13  -  0.34    0.18  -  0.38 
Covenants (dummy)  0.19  -  0.4    0.19  -  0.4 
Number of Facilities  3.71  3  2.66    3.33  3  2.23 
Secured (dummy)  0.077  -  0.27    0.07  -  0.25 
Unsecured (dummy)  0.025  -  0.16    0.03  -  0.18 
Loan Purposes               
General Corporate (dummy)  0.12  -  0.33    0.12  -  0.33 
Coporate Control (dummy)  0.51  -  0.5    0.47  -  0.5 
Capital Structure (dummy)  0.28  -  0.45    0.36  -  0.48 
Project Finance (dummy)  0.05  -  0.22    0.03  -  0.16 
               
Term Loan Volume ($MM)  3,662  2,761  2,874    3,715  2,910  2,653 
Revolver Loan Volume ($MM)  4,477  4,116  2,797    4,713  4,138  2,881 
               
Private (dummy)  0.63  -  0.48    0.5  -  0.5 
Small (dummy)  0.32  -  0.47    0.4  -  0.49 
Young (dummy)  0.44  -  0.5    0.45  -  0.5 
First-Time Loan (dummy)  0.53  -  0.5    0.45  -  0.5 
               
Firm Size ($MM)  -  -  -    4,470  940  22,673 
Age (years)  -  -  -    19.9  9  19.93 
Leverage Ratio (%)  -  -  -    0.41  0.35  0.28 
Interest Coverage Ratio (%)  -  -  -    2.86  2.63  0.88 
               
Total Assets ($MM)  -  -  -    668  639  332 
Net Loans (%)  -  -  -    68.12  67.89  22.65 
Liquid Assets (%)  -  -  -    26.37  23.34  27.76 
Non Performing Loans (%)  -  -  -    0.62  0.49  0.39 
Loan Loss Provisions (%)  -  -  -    0.01  0.01  0.004 
Investment Bank (dummy)  -  -  -    0.01  -  0.07 
Commercial Bank (dummy)  -  -  -    0.57  -  0.5 
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TABLE II 
LOAN, BORROWER AND BANK CHARACTERISTICS –  
CLUSTERED ACCORDING TO BORROWER ASSET SIZE 
This table presents descriptive statistics for completed dollar denominated loans, originated between 1996 and 2005, to U.K. companies 
excluding  regulated  and  financial  industries.  Loan,  borrower  and  bank  characteristics  are  grouped  according  to  borrower  asset  size. 
Borrowers’ and lenders’ characteristics are computed as of one year prior to the origination of the loan. For definitions of other dependent 
variables, please see the appendix. We include only loans, for which bank and borrower characteristics are available (N=988).  
 
    Loan Characteristics    Borrower Characteristics    Bank Characteristics 
Firm Size 
($BN)    
Maturity 
(months) 
Spread 
(bps)    
Firm Leverage 
(%) 
Interest 
Coverage 
(%) 
  
Tier-1  
Ratio 
(%) 
Equity  
Capital  
Ratio (%) 
                   
< 0.2    106.7  206.75    48.714  19.23    7.055  4.155 
0.2-0.5    73.92  187.58    39.905  26.08    7.834  4.575 
0.5-1    62.79  173.4    38.952  29.450    8.162  5.405 
1-3    58.94  156.37    41.656  5.05    8.063  4.873 
3-10    47.06  85.55    34.16  8.23    7.97  5.569 
> 10    44.18  59.5    27.101  3.13    7.648  5.679 
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TABLE III 
PERCENTAGE OF LOANS ISSUED AND AVERAGE LOAN SIZE  
ACCORDING TO NUMBER OF LEAD BANKS 
This table presents descriptive statistics of syndicate structures (number of lead banks) for loans issued to private vis-à-vis public firms. Only 
completed dollar denominated loans are considered, originated between 1996 and 2005, to U.K. companies excluding regulated and financial 
industries. Borrowers’ and lenders’ characteristics are computed as of one year prior to the origination of the loan. For definitions of other 
dependent variables, please see the appendix. We include only loans, for which bank and borrower characteristics are available (N=988).  
 
    Number of Lead Banks 
      1  < 3  < 5  < 10 
           
Private 
% of Loans  37%  70%  82%  91% 
Ø Loan Size ($MM)  107  127  150  160 
           
Public 
% of Loans  27%  53%  63%  77% 
Ø Loan Size ($MM)  254  302  356  417 
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TABLE IV 
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG PROXIES FOR BANK DEPENDENCE 
The table shows the relationship among switching cost proxies. Private is a dummy variable equal to one, if the firm is private. Small is 
dummy variable equal to one, if the company’s sales figure is below USD 430 million, which is the 30 percent quantile. Young is dummy 
variable equal to one, if the firm’s age since incorporation is equal or less than 9 years which is the median age in our sample. First time is a 
dummy variable equal to one, if the firm borrows for the first time in the syndicated loan market. 
 
  Share That Is 
   Private  Small  Young  First Time 
             
Private  1  0.43  0.96  0.62 
Public  0  0.19  0.82  0.43 
         
Small   0.78  1  0.98  0.66 
Large  0.57  0  0.87  0.48 
         
Young  0.65  0.36  1  0.57 
Old  0.04  0.02  0  0.32 
         
First Time  0.70  0.41  0.95  1 
Prior Lending Relationship  0.38  0.34  0.43  0 
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TABLE V 
LOAN SPREADS AND BANK CHARACTERISTICS 
The dependent variable is the All-In-Spread reported in Dealscan. All regressions are clustered at the lender parent level. Models 1 and 2 
only include proxies for bank portfolio risk; models 3 and 4 introduce bank liquidity risk. Model 5 includes all control variables for 
portfolio and liquidity risk. Borrower, loan and market control variables remain unchanged across all models. 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Weak Bank (Tier 1-Ratio < 6.3%)  40.237***  32.732***  19.858*  18.170*  33.793*** 
   (.003)  (.005)  (.07)  (.094)  (.007) 
Loan Loss Provisions (% of Total Loans)  -5.587**  -6.880***      -5.854** 
   (.017)  (.003)      (.016) 
Non Performing Loans (% of Total Assets)  2.758*        1.955 
   (.089)        (.216) 
High Nonperforming Loans    21.523**        
     (.028)        
Net Loans (% of Customer & Short Term Funding)      -0.531**    -0.176 
       (.034)    (.558) 
Liquid Assets (% of Customer & Short Term Funding)        0.723***  -0.084 
         (0.000)  (.769) 
Ln (Total Assets Bank)  25.545**  32.221***  3.882  12.854  30.810*** 
   (.02)  (.003)  (.664)  (.159)  (.004) 
           
Institutional Term Loan  18.373*  42.521***  35.576***  36.658***  43.527*** 
  (.077)  (0.000)  (.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Secured  58.784***  62.860***  54.307***  55.042***  61.207*** 
  (.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Performance Pricing  -19.291*  -20.857*  -26.401***  -24.822**  -20.457* 
  (.085)  (.053)  (.009)  (.014)  (.061) 
Covenants  18.665*  18.731*  24.431**  25.090***  20.146** 
  (.067)  (.058)  (.01)  (.008)  (.042) 
           
Market Controls (Revolver & Term Loan Volume, 
LIBOR) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
           
Borrower Credit Risk (Age, Leverage, Interest Coverage, 
Borrower Size) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
           
Loan Controls (Loan Size, Maturity, Number of Facilities, 
Unsecured) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
           
Loan Purpose (Corporate Control, Capital Structure, 
General Corporate Purpose)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
           
Industry (1-digit-SIC-Codes)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
           
Lender Country  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
           
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
           
Intercept  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
           
Observations  988  988  988  988  988 
Adjusted R-squared  0.3545  0.3942  0.3737  0.378  0.3933 
p-values in parentheses           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10           
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TABLE VI 
LOAN SPREADS AND BANK CHARACTERISTICS 
The dependent variable is the All-In-Spread reported in Dealscan. All regressions are clustered at the lender parent level. The first column 
repeats  the  model  1 in  Panel  A.  All  control  variables  from  regression models  1 to 5  from  Panel  A  are  included  in  the  regressions. 
Coefficients of these control variables are not shown for brevity. Model 6 and 7 differ from model 1 including a different threshold to define 
a weak bank. Model 1 uses the 1
st quartile as threshold, model 6 the median and model 7 the difference between the 1 percent quantile and 
the median. The interaction terms in model 8 use specification from model 1.  
 
  Model 1  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
Weak Bank (Tier 1-Ratio < 6.3% (1st quartile))  40.237***       
  (.003)       
Weak Bank (Tier 1-Ratio < 6.8% (Median))    40.237***     
    (.003)     
Weak Bank (4.8 < Tier 1-Ratio < 6.8)      20.770**   
      (.05)   
Loan Loss Provisions (% of Total Loans)  -5.587**  -5.587**  -5.738**  -5.817** 
  (.017)  (.017)  (.015)  (.039) 
Non Performing Loans (% of Total Assets)  2.758*  2.758*  1.871  2.629* 
  (.089)  (.089)  (.243)  (.093) 
Weak Bank * Year 1996        -36.772* 
        (.095) 
Weak Bank * Year 1997        -10.153 
        (.569) 
Weak Bank * Year 1998        -29.141** 
        (.037) 
Weak Bank * Year 1999        23.781 
        (.18) 
Weak Bank * Year 2000        6.308 
        (.86) 
Weak Bank * Year 2001        10.589 
        (.659) 
Weak Bank * Year 2002        22.065 
        (.292) 
Weak Bank * Year 2003        91.887*** 
        (.008) 
Weak Bank * Year 2004        73.064*** 
        (.001) 
Weak Bank * Year 2005        41.286*** 
        (.007) 
Ln (Total Assets Bank)  25.545**  20.7703**  25.544**  28.047*** 
  (.02)  (.05)  (.02)  (.001) 
         
Observations  988  988  988  988 
Adjusted R-squared  0.3545  0.3545  0.3498  0.4316 
p-values  in parentheses         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10         
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TABLE VII 
LOAN SPREADS FOR BANK DEPENDENT AND NOT-BANK DEPENDENT BORROWERS 
The  dependent  variable  is  the  All-In-Spread  reported  in  Dealscan.  All  regressions  are  clustered  at  the  lender  parent  level.  Only  the 
coefficient for the weak bank proxy (Tier 1-Ratio < 6.3% (1
st quartile)) is shown. Each coefficient represents an individual regression. All 
borrower, loan and market controls are identical to the models shown in Table 1-Panel A. Private is a dummy variable equal to one, if the 
firm is private. Small is dummy variable equal to one, if the company’s sales figure is below USD 430 million, which is the 30 percent 
quantile. Young is dummy variable equal to one, if the firm’s age since incorporation is equal or less than 9 years which is the median age 
in our sample. First time is a dummy variable equal to one, if the firm borrows for the first time in the syndicated loan market. Panel A 
shows full sample regression results. Panel B shows subsamples for loans issued before and after 2001. 
 
  Panel A      Panel B 
  Full Sample       Loan Issued Prior 2001  Loan Issued After 2001 
Benchmark Model (Model 1)  40.237***       12.115  69.853*** 
  (.003)       (.475)  (.001) 
Switching Cost Proxies            
            
Private vs. Public            
            
Private  79.343***       59.115  98.203*** 
  (.000)       (.144)  (.002) 
            
Public  -9.049       -10.664  44.558 
  (.512)       (.561)  (.139) 
            
Small vs. Large            
            
Small  76.569***       -4.617  113.951** 
  (.003)       (.89)  (.031) 
            
Large  -7.956       -6.697  7.34 
  (.643)       (.739)  (.809) 
            
Young vs. Old            
            
Young   48.931***       18.442  79.929*** 
  (.002)       (.378)  (.001) 
            
Old  23.514       9.512  -5.772 
  (.191)       (.591)  (.879) 
            
Pior Lending Relationships vs. First-Time Loan          
            
First-Time Loan  60.447***       35.104  120.798*** 
  (.001)       (.155)  (.000) 
            
Prior Lending Relationship  5.786       -5.115  1.983 
  (.796)       (.864)  (.955) 
           
p-values in parentheses                
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10           
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TABLE VIII 
LOANS SPREADS FOR BANK DEPENDENT AND NOT-BANK DEPENDENT BORROWERS  
ACROSS THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
The  dependent  variable  is  the  All-In-Spread  reported  in  Dealscan.  All  regressions  are  clustered  at  the  lender  parent  level.  Only  the 
coefficient  for  the  weak  bank  proxy  is  shown  proxy  (Tier  1-Ratio  <  6.3%  (1
st  quartile)).    Each  coefficient  represents  an  individual 
regression. All borrower, loan and market controls are identical to the models shown in Table 1-Panel A. Private is a dummy variable equal 
to one, if the firm is private. Small is dummy variable equal to one, if the company’s sales figure is below USD 430 million, which is the 30 
percent quantile. Young is dummy variable equal to one, if the firm’s age since incorporation is equal or less than 9 years which is the 
median age in our sample. First time is a dummy variable equal to one, if the firm borrows for the first time in the syndicated loan market. 
Panel A shows full sample regression results. Panel B shows subsamples for loans issued in expansions and recessions, respectively, based 
on the EuroCoin Index.  
 
  Panel A      Panel B 
  Full Sample       Loan Issued in Expansion  Loan Issued in Recession 
Benchmark Model (Model 1)  40.237***       14.473  77.93*** 
  (.003)       (.465)  (.000) 
Switching Cost Proxies            
            
Private vs. Public            
            
Private  79.343***       44.558  98.346*** 
  (.000)       (.322)  (.002) 
            
Public  -9.049       -12.917  37.867 
  (.512)       (.337)  (.17) 
            
Small vs. Large            
            
Small   76.569***       71.724  123.453*** 
  (.003)       (.18)  (.002) 
            
Large  -7.956       -27.646  9.524 
  (.643)       (.185)  (.77) 
            
Young vs. Old            
            
Young   48.931***       16.957  86.179*** 
  (.002)       0.464  (.000) 
            
Old  23.514       -25.762  1.924 
  (.191)       (.528)  (.859) 
            
Pior Lending Relationships vs. First-Time Loan          
            
First-Time Loan  60.447***       3.287  111.663*** 
  (.001)       (.891)  (.000) 
            
Prior Lending Relationship  5.786       -4.356  39.696 
  (.796)       (.916)  (.21) 
           
p-values in parentheses                
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10           
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TABLE IX 
LOANS SPREADS FOR BANK DEPENDENT AND NOT-BANK DEPENDENT BORROWERS  
AND ONLY UK LENDERS 
The  dependent  variable  is  the  All-In-Spread  reported  in  Dealscan.  All  regressions  are  clustered  at  the  lender  parent  level.  Only  the 
coefficient for the weak bank proxy is shown proxy (Tier 1-Ratio < 6.3% (1
st quartile)). Each coefficient represents an individual regression. 
All borrower, loan and market controls are identical to the models shown in Table 1-Panel A. Private is a dummy variable equal to one, if 
the firm is private. Small is dummy variable equal to one, if the company’s sales figure is below USD 430 million, which is the 30 percent 
quantile. Young is dummy variable equal to one, if the firm’s age since incorporation is equal or less than 9 years which is the median age 
in our sample. First time is a dummy variable equal to one, if the firm borrows for the first time in the syndicated loan market. Panel A 
shows full sample regression results. Panel B shows subsamples for loans issued in expansions and recessions, respectively, based on the 
EuroCoin Index.  
 
  Panel A      Panel B 
  Full Sample       Loan Issued in Expansion  Loan Issued in Recession 
            
Benchmark Model (Model 1)  48.16***       11.153  112.834*** 
  (.029)       (.726)  (.000) 
Switching Cost Proxies            
            
Private vs. Public            
            
Private  96.446**       0.785  131.949*** 
  (.011)       (.992)  (.000) 
            
Public  1.969       -17.588  90.697* 
  (.942)       0..382  (.077) 
            
Small vs. Large            
            
Small  91.205**       64.533  167.462*** 
  (.024)       (.583)  (.000) 
            
Large  -8.568       -75.707*  99.438* 
  (.792)       (.097)  (.076) 
            
Young vs. Old            
            
Young  110.735***       28.466  106.835*** 
  (.003)       (.754)  (.000) 
            
Old  19.375       34.329  73.897 
  (.465)       (.286)  (.135) 
            
Pior Lending Relationships vs. First-Time Loan          
            
First-Time Loan  63.204***       -9.63  120.69*** 
  (.007)       (.802)  (.001) 
            
Prior Lending Relationship  64.055*       51.949  79.995* 
  (.071)       (.465)  (.088) 
           
p-values in parentheses                
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10           
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TABLE X 
ACCOUNTING FOR ALTERNATIVE MACROECONOMIC AND BANK RISK PROXIES 
The dependent variable is the All-In-Spread reported in Dealscan. All regressions are clustered at the lender parent level. Panel A shows the 
results employing credit spreads as alternative proxy for external shocks. Panel B introduces alternative (qualitative) variables for bank risk. 
All other control variables remain unchanged compared to model 1.  
 
    Panel A           Panel B 
  Model 1  Model 9  Model 10       Model 11  Model 12 
Weak Bank (Tier 1-Ratio < 6.3% (1st quartile))  40.237***  40.329***  -49.045        43.137**  29.810*** 
   (.003)  (0.003)  (.33)       (.014)  (0.007) 
Credit Spread    58.057***  43.188**           
     (.004)  (.048)           
Weak Bank * Credit Spread      104.468*           
       (.066)           
Commercial Bank             -26.960**  -29.863*** 
              (.036)  (.002) 
Investment Bank               237.820*** 
                (.000) 
Loan Loss Provisions (% of Total Loans)  -5.587**  -5.218**  -5.133**       -5.300**    
   (.017)  (.026)  (.028)       (.029)    
Non Performing Loans (% of Total Assets)  2.758*  2.112  2.414       2.421    
   (.089)  (.195)  (.14)       (.12)    
Ln (Total Assets Bank)  25.545**  23.737**  24.144**       16.106*  2.868 
   (.02)  (.03)  (.027)        (.051)  (.761) 
                
Institutional Term Loan  18.373*  18.577*  18.226*       43.896***  36.534*** 
  (.077)  (.072)  (.078)       (.000)  (.000) 
Secured  58.784***  62.755***  64.138***       57.876**  54.088*** 
  (.001)  (.000)  (.000)       (.031)  (.000) 
Performance Pricing  -19.291*  -19.275*  -19.594*       -17.034  -19.912** 
  (.085)  (.083)  (.078)       (.101)  (.048) 
Covenants  18.665*  17.940*  18.005*       18.852*  23.059** 
  (.067)  (.077)  (.076)       (.059)  (.014) 
                
Market Controls (Revolver & Term Loan Volume, 
LIBOR) 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
    
Yes  Yes 
                
Borrower Credit Risk (Age, Leverage, Interest 
Coverage, Borrower Size) 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
    
Yes  Yes 
                
Loan Controls (Loan Size, Maturity, Number of 
Facilities, Unsecured) 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
    
Yes  Yes 
                
Loan Purpose (Corporate Control, Capital Structure, 
General Corporate Purpose)  Yes  Yes  Yes       Yes  Yes 
                
Industry (1-digit-SIC-Codes)  Yes  Yes  Yes       Yes  Yes 
                
Lender Country  Yes  Yes  Yes       Yes  Yes 
                
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes       Yes  Yes 
                
Intercept  Yes  Yes  Yes       Yes  Yes 
                
                
Observations  988  988  988        988  988 
Adjusted R-squared  0.35  0.36  0.36        0.394  0.3934 
p-values in parentheses               
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10               
 
 